We present two theorems that yield necessary and sufficient conditions for firstand second-degree stochastic dominance deteriorations of background risk to increase risk aversion, prudence, temperance, and all higher degrees of aversion to foreground risk. We thus complete the program initiated by Eeckhoudt et al. (1996) , and in the process answer a question raised by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) , and reiterated by Gollier and Pratt (1996) , by showing that properness implies random-wealth properness.
Introduction
showed that any mean preserving spread of the distribution of any foreground risk always reduces expected utility if and only if the decision maker is risk averse. Subsequently, Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) showed that any change in a foreground risk that induces a mean preserving spread of the distribution for the utility of one decision maker reduces the expected utility of a second if and only if the second is more risk averse than the first. Pratt (1964) had earlier shown that a decision maker's willingness to invest in a risky asset is governed by the degree of risk aversion. Applying these ideas to marginal utility rather than utility, one finds that any change in a foreground risk that induces a mean preserving spread of the distribution for one decision maker's marginal utility increases the expected marginal utility of a second if and only if the second is more prudent than the first, with Kimball (1993) having shown that the degree of prudence governs the strength of the precautionary motive for saving.
Intuition suggests that a decision maker's behavior regarding a foreground risk, as through investing, insuring, or saving, is influenced by changes in independent, unavoidable background risks. In this note, we present a general procedure for identifying restrictions on utility functions that are necessary and sufficient to ensure that risk aversion, prudence, and all higher degrees of aversion to foreground risk increase whenever background risk undergoes specific changes. We consider not only first-and second-degree stochastic dominance (FSD and SSD) deteriorations in the distribution of background risk, but also changes that induce stochastic dominance spreads in the distribution of utility or in the distribution of marginal utility.
When background risk is initially absent, the stochastic dominance spreads we examine correspond to introductions of background risks that are, respectively, unfavorable (fair or unfair), undesirable in terms of expected utility, and undesirable in terms of expected marginal utility. The restrictions on utility functions necessary and sufficient to ensure that risk aversion increases then identify those decision makers who exhibit, respectively, risk vulnerability in the sense of Gollier and Pratt (1996) , proper risk aversion in the sense of Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) , and standard risk aversion in the sense of Kimball (1990) .
1 Similarly, restrictions ensuring that prudence increases identify decision makers with prudence vulnerability, proper prudence, and standard prudence.
2
The restrictions we identify for stochastic dominance deteriorations of an existing background risk always to increase risk aversion generalize those obtained by Eeckhoudt et al. (1996) to situations where foreground risk is also present. These decision makers may be said to exhibit risk vulnerability for stochastic dominance deteriorations of background risk. Using our general procedure, we then characterize decision makers who exhibit proper (standard) risk aversion for stochastic dominance deteriorations of utility (marginal utility), and indicate the manner in which our results can be used to characterize decision makers who exhibit prudence vulnerability, proper prudence, and standard prudence for stochastic dominance deteriorations.
1 When discussing properness, we adopt the terminology employed by Gollier and Pratt. Thus, for example, where Pratt and Zeckhauser refer to "fixed-wealth proper" utility functions, we follow Gollier and Pratt and call these functions "proper."
2 Lajeri-Chaherli (2004) proposed this terminology for introductions of background risk, referring to "precautionary vulnerability" rather than prudence vulnerability.
Thus, our approach is fully general, applying equally to all degrees of aversion to foreground risk, embracing both introductions and deteriorations of background risk that are large or infinitesimal, and accommodating each of the undesirability concepts for background risks. Our approach pays further dividends by yielding new characterizations of proper and standard risk aversion, and by affirmatively resolving the question raised by Pratt and Zeckhauser as to whether proper risk aversion is sufficient for randomwealth properness.
Greater Aversion to Foreground Risk in the Presence of Background Risk
Let denote the n ) ( ) ( w u n th derivative of . We assume that, for all , is strictly uniformly signed for all , and alternates in sign as n increases, beginning with positive. We interpret as . Define the index of n 
th degree averse to foreground risk than is , that is,
When background risk is initially absent, so that )
requires that the decision maker become more n th degree averse to foreground risk when exposed to a background risk. If in addition 1 = n , then inequality (1) reduces to 4 Without loss of generality, we assume that the supports for θ and ε are contained within compact intervals. 5 Proofs of our results are provided in the Appendix.
for all θ . The concepts of risk vulnerability, proper risk aversion, and standard risk aversion impose increasingly strict conditions on utility functions to ensure that this inequality holds for introductions of background risks belonging to increasingly wide classes, namely those that are unfavorable, those that reduce expected utility, and those that raise expected marginal utility. In this paper, we identify conditions ensuring that inequality (1) also holds for introductions, additions, and stochastic dominance deteriorations of background risk that belong to each of these three classes.
Rather than examine these cases separately, we present two theorems that cover all cases for FSD and SSD spreads, respectively. To this end, we introduce the
, and three alternative representations,
, and , to characterize decision makers who are, respectively, vulnerable, proper, and standard. In each instance, 
As a result, for example, when ) (
, and any such change in background risk always results in an increase in the degree of prudence for ) ( 
FSD Spreads of Background Risk
In our first result, we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for any FSD spread of background risk to increase n th degree aversion to foreground risk. . This property is specific to FSD spreads, and does not hold for higher-order spreads.
In the case of , condition (2) yields as necessary and sufficient for the existence of a function
When foreground risk is wholly absent, θ has a fixed value and condition (3) reduces to the condition in Proposition 2 of Eeckhoudt et al. In a like manner, applying Theorem 1 in the case of , condition (2) yields as necessary and sufficient for 2
and for ) ( ) (
When there is no background risk initially, condition (3) for greater risk aversion
and for the introduction of a small background risk this condition further reduces to
, that is, non-increasing absolute risk aversion in the sense of Arrow (1965) and Pratt. Similar remarks apply to conditions (4) and (5) for increased prudence and temperance.
SSD Spreads of Background Risk
Our second result provides a necessary and sufficient condition for any mean preserving spread (MPS) of background risk to increase n th degree aversion to foreground risk. 
With the aid of equation (8) 
for proper risk aversion there exits a function ) ( (3) and (9) reduce to
and for the introduction of a small background risk these conditions further reduce to the "local vulnerability" conditions of Gollier and Pratt,
With respect to proper risk aversion, Gollier and Pratt (p. 1120) remark that no one has been able to resolve the question raised by Pratt and Zeckhauser (p. 145) as to whether properness is sufficient for random-wealth properness, which refers to cases where background risk is present prior to the introduction of a second, independent, undesirable background risk. Following Pratt and Zeckhauser, properness at y refers to the introduction of background risk beginning from a given background wealth y, and properness is properness at y for all y. The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 establish that conditions (3) and (10) are necessary for the utility function to be proper at y for all y. As the discussion in Kimball (1993, pp. 603-604) makes clear, the addition of an independent, undesirable risk to an existing risk results in a SSD deterioration of the utility distribution, and so conditions (3) and (10) 
along with condition (3).
When there is initially neither foreground nor background risk, and small background and foreground risks are introduced, condition (13) for properness at w for all w then reduces to
which is equivalent to 
, and we obtain the novel condition for standard risk aversion,
, (15) along with condition (3). For introductions of small foreground risks, (15) It is now clear that the conditions of Corollary 2 can be extended to higher degrees of aversion to foreground risk by appropriately increasing the order of the utility derivatives. For example, the conditions for greater prudence are (4), in place of (3), and (9)-(11) with edginess replacing temperance, temperance replacing prudence, and prudence replacing risk aversion.
Appendix
In this Appendix we provide proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorems 1 and 2.
Proof of Lemma 1. Under the conditions of the Lemma, we wish to establish
Applying integration by parts, multiplying and dividing the integrand by , and then applying integration by parts a second time, we arrive at
Since the change from ) ,
induces a SSD deterioration of the distribution for , the integral within braces is always nonnegative.
Hence, inequality (A.2) holds if we have
This inequality is also necessary for (A.2), since if it were to fail at , then we could We wish to show that, for any , we have
if and only if condition (2) holds. Multiplying both sides of inequality (A.4) by and then adding yields the equivalent inequality
since and alternate in sign beginning with a positive value for . Using the definition for , we find that (A.5) is equivalent to
where it is understood that ) (ϕ ε ε = . Applying integration by parts to both integrals and combining the two sides, we arrive at , and the inequality reflects the fact that the second ratio in the integrand can be interpreted as a probability density. The sufficiency part of Theorem 1 then follows since condition (2) and inequality (A.8) imply
for all θ and ϕ , establishing that the first bracketed term at (A.7) is always nonpositive.
To demonstrate necessity, suppose that (2) does not hold at , , and , so that We may assume that ) , (
can be made arbitrarily close to the right-hand side of (A.10).
Evaluating (A.7) with and then dividing both sides by θ θ=
can be chosen so that the left-hand side of (A.12) approximates the lefthand side of (A.10), while the right-hand side of (A.10) already approximates the righthand side of (A.12). Since (A.12) then contradicts (A.10), the supposition that condition (2) need not hold must be false.
For cases in which the initial background risk ) , (
is degenerate with all probability massed at φ , inequality (A.6) simplifies to 
where it is again understood that ) (ϕ ε ε = , and for the second derivative we obtain Carrying out the integration by parts and combining the two sides, we arrive at A.18) by combining the second inequality of condition (6) with the first inequality of (A.17).
The inequalities of (A.18) and the first inequality of condition (6) by combining the second inequalities of condition (6) and of (A.17) . Now the inequalities of (A.19) and the first inequality of condition (6) imply that T is again nonnegative. Thus, condition (6) 
